Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 27f431ab31f445d2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.5 KB Created: 2020-07-09 03:59:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-04
MD5: 2d99b482fda899ba1f714a49654bb0a6 SHA-1: 3d781d740df4ed68ab937c85d004c2a29cd8f7b9 SHA-256: 27f431ab31f445d2b033061d5b1f6676bce074a7a6b065d3d75a275c7fcfcafe
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, many of which point to known malicious redirectors or link farms. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness. The document body, though obfuscated, contains URLs that are also present in the heuristic findings, suggesting a lure to external malicious content. The primary attack pattern involves redirecting users to potentially harmful websites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=plant%20commissioning%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.traveltrailersusa.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379552/5013df27c2e0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ninelivestwine.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874629/vezik_gunefitotokek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.duncanwoodsmusic.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380998/lewamurer_vesuju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.balloontwistersdcvamd.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969375/gipagazovupibiz_tolokaduwimola.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.heatherbeardsley.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695333/mexozunakojogej-fetifokijekejov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.hhnailstrips.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164007/wadorax-gevireme-zunofi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mycorporatecounselor.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681951/koniramogil-dizofudab-vopoje-pofop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://jufekam.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/tetapojafi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xupamuxak.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/37217643240.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jagunijo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/86000580102.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zunizavuj.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/famurilagarofododogawazo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rizefoxug.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/76758804249.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://viselotefiru.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/79713263653.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ginopurox574319465.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/57588606963.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/vazakiliduvapi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/97253363073.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/danedogorolulefumatexa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007117.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7117 5052 bytes
SHA-256: 6043f5a4be7840320ba48ff435e22637bc679160c8c75b6b457e11cbbcb12c3e
font_01_sfnt_off0000821f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x821F 10288 bytes
SHA-256: d1d00545fed3a4b08f42cd2218c59951e250af7115f9a665260967699ab29bf0

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