Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 27efbc4eb50391ff…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.2 KB Created: 2021-02-13 13:14:50 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-17
MD5: 5d45344157fbe18704f408bfeb5e5417 SHA-1: 4d16975c1c6b67422e7d42afc6d26a8cdc3344f3 SHA-256: 27efbc4eb50391ff93b307fe996ab100e64bee0e1a18d28ee52cd66ba2f8937e
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable domains and Weebly/sqhk.co subdomains, indicative of a link farm. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, specifically a phishing or trojan distribution campaign. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm heuristic suggest it's designed to redirect users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://seumenha.ru/aws?utm_term=tipos+de+aprendizaje+segun+autores+pdf PDF link annotation
    • http://votewimuvuxa.iblogger.org/23531487707.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4455886/normal_5fcdadf0a83d4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zutujodara/QhaigaZ/ladobekepubimisij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://medivurufif.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407406/fenekezovajef-terofufafu-futotomex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nemelodanunoju.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874480/fukata.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/risejesob/ghgCBhb/n64_emulator_project_64.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xunedoworevesa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164322/a95b2fd08.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fomunova.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134684458/2769480.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sidamebo/x2hdTyQ/73533632967.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4455370/normal_5fdd2ec84584a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xuwifoviwalo/haPAslq/85577476911.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://popokafiri.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437291/3113233.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://kuxixatizoxop.epizy.com/vovekikamamezudenurave.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vogurapake.epizy.com/free_html_web_page_design_templates.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dd09.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD09 5252 bytes
SHA-256: 3bc338aebdd768a8b55705a0b7bf036ed2acdd6268ea612e0969ca904229fe19
font_01_sfnt_off0000ef05.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEF05 10936 bytes
SHA-256: a63ea3a8104049f65a80895d7363bbf5da27a1e36834b636c1116230e7c0a1b5