Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 27e3ef788072912f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.2 KB Created: 2020-10-09 05:10:26 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: 9ccb79e847b7e20909f54864cd3d4c34 SHA-1: a00b9c43ade73d425d887025b35fb90632746104 SHA-256: 27e3ef788072912f9479232eb6949fcf621e375fff1b68e01f9e14cd25eb8ab3
224 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/pify?keyword=higher+lower+order+questions In PDF document text
    • http://files.gijogymnasticsofillinoisjuniororganization.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379928/84e13f073.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.alexvanndesign.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437087/pubufonamalutir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.myecns.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856934/gogab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.gogreenparkridge.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873851/nomugepiberakek-mofejawukagib-xaxisewa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vofalul.poromechanics.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454766/felotovisu-zewuwif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://betesawuf.diasalinas.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739720/9e262ac3df7c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jamiemuffett.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637271/7af53b0785c5d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sepupa.larcheatlanta.org/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856917/a8d101d6247f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0463/3863/7981/files/honda_seat_covers_crv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7483/7923/files/ccsf_spring_2020_calendar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0481/2891/7657/files/782_area_code_usa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8d7d72d5-4da9-44f1-945f-1a20abeb34f5/fuzexubef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c26c6be3-4edf-4852-8f80-5cdbad87b169/bowotarenanejobiga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/cf6c3332-0d09-40fc-b4c6-fd91b109f984/mewidipomagafukananojunek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/bc3d0c7c-90fe-43ea-9bdc-4c83d1b8a425/16204530253.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005fca.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5FCA 5056 bytes
SHA-256: 291454795529ee055f26df42f74a2bbfbf85dda49e6ae6eeff2473130f68aa92
font_01_sfnt_off000070ff.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x70FF 10688 bytes
SHA-256: 053a89246d54afe38683c8d65ff618bdca842438a75accfefae5a11c8773bdfc

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