Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 27bc1a3cd954563f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.6 KB Created: 2020-11-05 01:11:57 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-12-26
MD5: 5a8332e85539b8311c94c4c9ff353031 SHA-1: 5813368562ba3e86718e8a69f14d78f3645a9952 SHA-256: 27bc1a3cd954563f391cdc29ecfc9c80dbfc7f8add98e6cc93b8f56488d3a679
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=ffx+omega+ruins+guide In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370051/normal_5f8aa714c661e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rivisoni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739016/bunup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kiwemedorupa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134446537/pebujizodelu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wefamojugibe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164519/04ac323ba38.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fotejisatowonu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302873/05f7e70129.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374198/normal_5f8b177fba211.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://votarozoxanobo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134315144/958776bf6c0f81.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://febixitojujemo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134402622/2917838.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nudojafobedem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379550/dukemapa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nexajatolotol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134308242/4ee950f72.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sisodiwitamusoz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681746/zidilud_dogitozejawo_vigematerajope_rulovibudojes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jopomewimedadi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134465277/0d999efe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4401525/normal_5f9bc5082cf00.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00007502.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00007502.bin)
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tadovu/bauhaus_design.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jezaxojipevu/zappos_at_work_program.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jeworurowam/oregon_polst_form_spanish.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00007502.bin)
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off0000ac2e.bin)
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn extracted file (font_02_sfnt_off0000ac2e.bin)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007502.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7502 5220 bytes
SHA-256: 3136bdd7284e6297ecc5b1b3ca4d67e0a510250a49dfcdbf681b2ebbc9f291e0
font_01_sfnt_off000086b6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x86B6 10900 bytes
SHA-256: d9e29f2b6ac04882af0170100788b1ba3174e7a490a30496a22f44bbc36eefad
font_02_sfnt_off0000ac2e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAC2E 16092 bytes
SHA-256: 9af6fc3bf9d751f70540aea0fa47faa159a3604992cda23d2adcda3ffc5346b2