RTF malware analysis — malicious · 27a76df4fef94ac1

MALICIOUS

RTF

422.9 KB Created: 2019-03-12 22:25:00 First seen: 2020-09-04

MD5: 9c70de8b2e6de89be3c1376fbf7fe090 SHA-1: b2a5d402efe0b25adbc81591fa7da4dbd5974954 SHA-256: 27a76df4fef94ac189118565478584751781b2a70e616e21e57e4ee478bccc96

262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple embedded OLE objects and triggers an ".objupdate" command, which is indicative of exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-8759 for client execution. ClamAV detections further confirm its malicious nature, flagging it as Doc.Macro.Obfuscation. The primary attack vector is likely spearphishing attachment, with the embedded OLE object serving as the mechanism to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759

RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6948043-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6948043-0
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 7 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00002d00.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2D00	16955 bytes
SHA-256: `2f932e28be552b90ae6650c6ad98942a640621197db4182bf6575d74c96e9c38`
Detection ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6948043-0 Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
`objdata_01_off0001074b.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1074B	16955 bytes
SHA-256: `4bafe78fae219d4a9855b12394604029d96da41dc2c014cc7fbaa8384a311723`
Detection ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6948043-0 Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
`objdata_02_off0001e196.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1E196	16955 bytes
SHA-256: `19c888256834f38fc1f6c685ea31c71938716fff760e5d81218058f55162684f`
Detection ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6948043-0 Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
`objdata_03_off0002bbe1.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2BBE1	16955 bytes
SHA-256: `d217a143501839992fd4588a3d2d4d4368dff8ce8ef5caaf5bd0b8536aeaa4ab`
Detection ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6948043-0 Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
`objdata_04_off0003962c.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x3962C	16955 bytes
SHA-256: `4fabe550852b50ee702ec0cf6851f4a995ab85d0890d7e4fc3c675c20a2ba422`
Detection ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6948043-0 Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
`objdata_05_off00047077.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x47077	16955 bytes
SHA-256: `3c720352c0afded4b68c232074ee6662228b8d5f3c8b66e9d0df574cf53e6974`
Detection ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6948043-0 Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
`objdata_06_off00054ac2.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x54AC2	16955 bytes
SHA-256: `d6aeab81a9f869da5fde554ca677582daf9d2734a349fbfcc1c4b730edf78722`
Detection ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6948043-0 Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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