RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 27a135e9e9379d39

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

341.2 KB First seen: 2021-09-23

MD5: 317e406416741340fb45b5ce31bfbb11 SHA-1: 5693f10f47fdfb89591c974694a97cb29daf150f SHA-256: 27a135e9e9379d39398b11be7f6702f0523053ac41f77564b8bc1749875deac9

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers. This suggests the document is designed to exploit OLE object activation to execute arbitrary code upon opening. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further supports this, indicating the document likely prompts the user to enable content or macros. No scripts were extracted, and no document body was available for analysis, limiting the ability to determine the exact payload or lure.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000969.bin` `b65323a1ff9ecb6fa7be15f20fbf23d036c766956f615d4d1a615be945bff5c6`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x969	75724 bytes
`objdata_01_off0002714c.bin` `f4c761490fd63fc4aa791746a9a2b588dafd9e2c764f57f0c85377b99ef07062`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2714C	2632 bytes
`objdata_02_off000286ef.bin` `44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x286EF	12297 bytes

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