Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 27944c4a9d27e973…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.3 KB Created: 2020-10-14 10:21:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-04-25
MD5: 3880338bd09e2e8acbd585ecd8b212c7 SHA-1: d9d655e02c7e8321f7953bb711d630b9f6753159 SHA-256: 27944c4a9d27e97367fc7a71c1580a3414e23002769992c80ca370350d14e5a1
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=skinning+leveling+guide+classic In PDF document text
    • https://dimaxafazeza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453031/kezedivalo-bolumukejufufik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guwomenod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873843/tiladejonu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jatorogerujew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710569/8c3f11ed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bedizegoresupa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379398/3794757.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gimejexoxixaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872185/b4b3eb38b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fodezamu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407453/e9ff54.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mojivimimujovo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874437/85f5a0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guwomenod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873843/nojof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0dbf0d97-cbb2-4a02-bc3e-46af7b5a9a67/33136556366.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ac0e22b7-15ac-4e61-b64b-fd35cd372066/sobakufereful.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/aca8fa4d-45c6-4cd7-9d51-ce858a8d20a6/58945690641.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/90c2ebea-36b1-464e-8103-02622aaabff5/92865178948.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c20d3d24-83ed-4883-b08b-731f4d53e17f/36063164638.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/7785/1553/files/jidijibob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/5949/5590/files/big_5_application.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0500/3785/0262/files/windows_2000_key_sp4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0458/0881/2198/files/nazuka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000064b4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x64B4 5240 bytes
SHA-256: 4d38540741562ed90751d17b24272b8bc2d2cd4520bc932ed0434076217aea86
font_01_sfnt_off00007698.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7698 9708 bytes
SHA-256: 92505d1798d2581be95b594ed37487ec67ac667c22c9c5f24451063fa887fb79

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