Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 278a01105105ba46…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.21 MB
MD5: a9c56c16c6c705510fea0b1419f87ec0 SHA-1: b6274154f6f8301de35df1c346d534a0c782ec6d SHA-256: 278a01105105ba46b8303bb8933c4a3010aa7098342460ab4090e3ddbafb19ab
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as an Equation Editor object, triggering heuristics related to CVE-2017-11882. This exploit is known to allow for arbitrary code execution. The decoded object data suggests an attempt to execute embedded scripts, likely to download and run a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001116.bin
8f922ebaf9f648766e82f6b998fdc2561ded10873a5d6e23f29b75fefe7b7722
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1116 26851 bytes
objdata_01_off0001c69b.bin
fe43efbadd674765243cb2580d9955cd54bcbea3b2eb0d6d648fe532cb7ef883
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C69B 476202 bytes