Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 277ca0574a1ff8cb…

MALICIOUS

RTF

725.9 KB Created: 2019-01-07 23:54:00 First seen: 2020-07-24
MD5: 84aefa0cc8a4c54c601b7635d3ad4d0d SHA-1: 45264454889b66516d19d479be0f47526eea2403 SHA-256: 277ca0574a1ff8cbebe3f30e59736775962135aaa5ff0f7decd2b6c247a4ae8a
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains multiple OLE object embeddings, with specific rules indicating the presence of package objects and an \objupdate command designed to force OLE activation. This suggests the file is designed to exploit vulnerabilities within OLE object handling to execute arbitrary code. The embedded object file 'objdata_00_off00000b2c.bin' is the primary artifact of interest.

Heuristics 5

  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Package object class high RTF_OBJCLASS_PACKAGE
    OLE Package object — can wrap arbitrary files
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 10 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000a80.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA80 32827 bytes
SHA-256: 5c06acb69c6d0c0f224a8e28bed44a2e5496def8b7cb1558b16ab8195ce0a815