Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2765dfd16fdca9a7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

536.4 KB
MD5: 908cfed6afafd9b15422a10ec069fa9d SHA-1: 039bba1e26fdf4e2c7c9e150451ced968d419ca7 SHA-256: 2765dfd16fdca9a7de04c08d68e28ed8331d98df4e082f10d3cc62ae9a6d09a8
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating auto-linking and an update trigger (".objupdate"). This suggests the document is designed to automatically activate and execute embedded content when opened, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic further supports this, indicating the document attempts to trick the user into enabling content execution.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bb0.bin
5801e0052f56b9f075adb89af04a62bbf393824a71637dddda35727b2c46e877
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBB0 171562 bytes
objdata_01_off00057e41.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x57E41 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off000593e4.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x593E4 12297 bytes