Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 27237c634430867f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

227.7 KB
MD5: 8267d5d2226c81c92af18a02f0f2af74 SHA-1: fd50eb69c9c0195cbbe3f30c2d18c6bba0296666 SHA-256: 27237c634430867f474aa7936cfed730c68815a889a137e1bf61033f9ffc6e1f
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to activate embedded content. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to enable macros or editing, a common social engineering tactic. This suggests the file's primary purpose is to exploit OLE vulnerabilities or trick the user into executing embedded code, likely leading to a second-stage download and execution.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
ba20364089b2fa2c07e0348c39f5d314402aaba384b10ade4cbb58582c88b8ce
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 19844 bytes
objdata_01_off0000ab42.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAB42 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000c0e5.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC0E5 12297 bytes