Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2716bdd86f5e2a53…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

422.2 KB
MD5: 115cb391afa5ed68f040ec69b00c84c1 SHA-1: 319cea32abbb8ef0a55fff174dafdea4d3a7b0c7 SHA-256: 2716bdd86f5e2a5364c1dd061a36270bf8eade4838e0e0e08677093bc0b8d910
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with high-confidence heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers. This suggests the document is designed to exploit OLE object activation to execute embedded content, bypassing user prompts and macro security. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further supports this, indicating the document likely contains instructions to enable content. The embedded OLE objects are the primary mechanism for delivering a malicious payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000969.bin
3d398fafabb1f8aa4674615f50e99f0c7bb92aa68d929a378755942a646b0fed		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x969 116297 bytes
objdata_01_off0003baf4.bin
76d4b8abb802bd06807a33ff09524d55e3d2a62fcd03f4b22006247f71e3f743		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3BAF4 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0003d097.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3D097 12297 bytes

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