Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 270af47ca7077bab…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.2 KB Created: 2021-07-27 09:50:31 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: b891ab887c6f04d70a98f3ba8a2e0acb SHA-1: ee3e09f74fa524e021146a054dec30c611972287 SHA-256: 270af47ca7077baba7583dfe357ed72861f8c1f12c9ba1372f1c5b1faef4a6af
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The PDF is identified as a phishing lure due to its image-heavy nature and embedded links pointing to compromised CMS uploads. The document likely aims to deceive users into downloading further malicious content by presenting a deceptive interface. No scripts were extracted, but the presence of numerous links to potentially compromised WordPress sites suggests a phishing campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 1 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 80 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.oschouston.com/osc/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609f2042c1604---sivipusiwugipolizipus.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://thehawthornnyc.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a7c777927f1---foxuzi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://baugeraeteverleih.de/benutzerdateien/xosujoxe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://stefandes.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16086d40d7235c---digizibeberutanabale.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hospvetcentral.pt/site/upload/file/niraluzexasi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cruiseship.cruises/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8ua9fbkokh7osjvd1tc9gnnaq6/diwepix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nam.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609856739f294---wanume.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tolgyesvolgy.hu/userfiles/file/ribox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://assurancemauricie.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075e4f02dad4---62560064037.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://simonkuehner.de/gfx/userfiles/files/tuvepixukasud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://architettoletiziamasciotta.eu/userfiles/files/kifimijipezozep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asirius.su/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/508f83b5610932a2b1291c622da9c4c6/68838093249.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alsumiri.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7b82ade51562f40b79701e231d96c71e/dobiwix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mzr-avocats.com/buddha/ckfinder/userfiles/files/texot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mas.vacations/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ee433081109---11632981117.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.wcd.com.tw/ezadmin/ckfinder/userfiles/files/gomevitozafepopulutopexew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://for-rent-antwerp.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160736725b8386---54992483985.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nexxosrealty.com/userfiles/files/timapam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://horizonpestservices.com/userfile/dipebisire.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://moorheadhigh1970.com/clients/c/c3/c3beaea4c2dff0dfe15f0c96d12524a1/File/moperika.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://prsnashville.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b56a098b98d7748310e8ac28336fd8b0/71877122735.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://proxima-design.cz/files/file/3413831153.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://shotclock.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/df0a773ae197a5d522315e42974150b2/69018975930.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/FevRqgeaUVY/uplcv?utm_term=bloons+tower+defense+6+hacked+unblockedPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000de14.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDE14 13912 bytes
SHA-256: 5bf45e683ef1df9cdeab14a88ba63b1cf9841953705c8c5ce289c51d7f2fa613
font_01_sfnt_off00010050.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10050 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00011867.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11867 11120 bytes
SHA-256: ff98bd9e79a51e705fdccf62070e60ab17a4d552fcaf8ad81a26378fe70c0e9a