Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 26a1dfa03c1907eb…

MALICIOUS

RTF

9.6 KB
MD5: e6d6a558fb3e82d0ce3b63f4efe1fde8 SHA-1: d9774a968fe136bf470617530a85736ddafe92c6 SHA-256: 26a1dfa03c1907eb275639ddcc40b78713598a33c9842ee03d882941eae4af57
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains critical heuristics indicating the exploitation of the Equation Editor (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR) and the use of OLE object data (RTF_OBJDATA) with an object update trigger (RTF_OBJUPDATE). This strongly suggests a classic exploit delivery mechanism. While no specific URLs or scripts were extracted, the presence of these exploit-related heuristics points to a malicious document designed to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000fa0.bin
593f210daa9deaeb922150cd3e66ad763d76f6ef75b7ae6793b9e2542380962d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xFA0 1770 bytes