Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 269365f58ac2f72a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

103.1 KB Created: 2021-07-04 21:14:08 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 23d292489ee8c0d945f8e9d225f02660 SHA-1: b4b05462a6bc865cb8dc3b41df10eaed496f1cc0 SHA-256: 269365f58ac2f72aaa8ebbdb936a26afa19a769aa0085c005c2882a26f5a8242
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF document was flagged by ML classifiers and ClamAV as malicious, specifically as a phishing trojan. Heuristics indicate it employs social engineering tactics, instructing users to copy and paste content into command-line interfaces, a known method to bypass security controls. The document also contains numerous links to external sites, some hosted on compromised WordPress installations, suggesting it may be part of a phishing campaign or used to redirect users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9773

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://coretry.ru/uplcv?utm_term=shortcut+for+save+as+in+word
    • https://mingyi-lock.com/data/file/userfiles/files/21368725404.pdf
    • https://signaturetowerpune.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3mrm7ra75s400s28kv0l8llak2/68342751403.pdf
    • http://xn--42-6kcdlkbomh7beggito5p.xn--p1ai/userfiles/file/47100626358.pdf
    • http://kirakuramenandsushi.com/uploads/files/91359581315.pdf
    • https://jennysbooks.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/07497a06b542bcd446b128b8eecd2641/13414317671.pdf
    • https://postscriptproductions.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a41d3b951da---pajodatez.pdf
    • http://127.0.0.1/kardelenemlak/upload/files/95827522226.pdf
    • https://sipare.com.ar/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/eai75o5ak608auglle7o9edcfo/gugevujojajojeg.pdf
    • http://cedresarquitectura.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607d70227d840---32023679037.pdf
    • http://aeskulap24h.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607cab8cdcb27---63630612268.pdf
    • https://snqrsl.quebec/upload/editor/file/45809260004.pdf
    • http://lighthouseofworship.com/clients/44803/File/vaduximuzewofejuginasaziz.pdf
    • http://ceskylakros.cz/userfiles/file/52537351122.pdf
    • https://weblative.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/kkd5u4d7quhfli68526pdpeihh/84111837265.pdf
    • http://joshuadacosta.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607174555e225---vidadavipukelisoweb.pdf
    • https://nuevocoach.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/434dc884726b8becb70fac13e2087ac2/41814551537.pdf
    • https://cmfnepal.org/userfiles/files/25984539650.pdf
    • https://lea-inc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1a1c246929eaf4deae4123d087b73444/16765834414.pdf
    • http://driver-jazda.pl/upload/file/dumokusojumiwedowaluwiza.pdf
    • https://fitnessrev.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/731nmg39k0ni2srtgp9ih9jckt/livobotuxef.pdf
    • http://cobe-ing.it/userfiles/files/29330609666.pdf
    • https://empylean.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/s67rc8jb40kb17glo52mmg373c/21087144192.pdf
    • https://arvikabc.com/images/uploadedimages/file/82173893272.pdf
    • http://aihyang.com/userfiles/file/gagekifa.pdf
    • http://stopasbestos.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608d71082e533---bojulagoremefuf.pdf
    • http://iltorg.ru/upload/file/bepitazunudatiluva.pdf
    • https://growmytruck.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8404dee3937ba79b9373fdcda896caf9/42576838974.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00012d0d.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12D0D 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00014524.bin
740e31f4e7930bc69a59ddd48aac72c593a9cdd810543507c09c3e24d0879805		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14524 10856 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00015e3e.bin
6994fabad82bf24a6fa0ad6389d6c2f289b36fd7b15ee59c00056fd76c91edd4		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15E3E 18264 bytes

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