Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 269196c53e51a58c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.4 KB Created: 2020-07-11 10:23:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-08-10
MD5: e36f65a0f17a2ed182728163f0f6615a SHA-1: 3df0b4dced47b7bf022ee73662dbc35fcee195a7 SHA-256: 269196c53e51a58c132f9b067737f227657e0dcd520c3931a90922f28a003404
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to known malicious redirector infrastructure or link farms. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to URLs that are likely used to direct users to malicious sites. The primary goal appears to be to redirect users to external, potentially harmful, web content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=basel+1+framework+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.mustardseedmarketinggroup.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132683088/malero.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jillianabrownphotography.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739513/1d3abcb3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.cardionrcc.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740090/7388e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jaibaidell.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383977/9e43b4d83f782b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thecapitolschool.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813429/jekokulugitoji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jparkercyber.net/uploads/1/3/2/7/132741045/988793.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.norcalsmartvestorpro.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710655/96f0fa3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.saracolemft.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164252/1944376.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.wirraparinga.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969645/57ff9ab25e6a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.free2code-initiative.eu/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407010/b019c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://topidumot.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/16696721713.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kizemir.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/binekekogig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sisakapajaw.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/7851817215.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nakilopediv.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/61897474388.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vupejesos.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/winanubaran.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gozezade421546286.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/65080283000.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tobilabutero.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/wenuwigofomubepow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0032/3478/files/wikelekonubivav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4293/8784/files/dugid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/92283418618.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/0151/2090/files/jizokoma.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/97428896976.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000063ff.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x63FF 5000 bytes
SHA-256: 4e4b8a98458713b45ed5fc8da5ff157c3377e93002d21e3d6505c0448e23d003
font_01_sfnt_off00007512.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7512 10288 bytes
SHA-256: 921f11c1d298a8870131037efeb84524bc07763a798d7519f68585ea451d9142