PDF malware analysis — malicious · 267b2d17e1c6fcc8

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.2 KB Created: 2020-10-23 20:01:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14

MD5: ef47dc83a50aede38f31535b056920c7 SHA-1: 84a856b122ce8a6e214bc2ff97f3f90591280886 SHA-256: 267b2d17e1c6fcc8d6df56b8dfd96de0fb6ae17e154f5f52d3c4a4e7ca4470b7

154 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a link to a known malicious redirector, which is designed to lead users to further malicious content. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that matches the redirector found by heuristics. The presence of numerous external PDF links, many pointing to S3 buckets, suggests a link farm or SEO poisoning attempt to distribute malicious content.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK

PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM

Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL https://ttraff.me/123?keyword=maths+activity+worksheets+for+kindergarten In PDF document text
- https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4384167/normal_5f8c88502890e.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4388406/normal_5f8d8f334fb35.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365575/normal_5f87d45d9dc4d.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383138/normal_5f9242d06b5b3.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367311/normal_5f8740abd412b.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366371/normal_5f874cc592009.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4403421/normal_5f92c6e3d981d.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://riragojefo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857115/vexukolu_dasove.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://numomepezudoti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134320197/4973718.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://depufavekozumel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134017714/3794742.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.opentle.orgIn PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/xanebavifamopez/wexafokosozudesaginidub.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/gorajikunobixi/cadaver_exquisito_agustina_bazterrica.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/remeranexe/petasivililotezaz.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/gupuso/45987893482.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e2074147-5772-409a-b843-770b8d973713/formula_para_pendiente.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3f49bd13-1518-4e87-af08-826bd93e6c46/tufetefitoxibidox.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/vazisi/cementitious_materials_for_nuclear_waste_immobilization.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/mudurixo/aisi_321.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/zirojopemup/jisokebadatet.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/zetare/kizabiwaw.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/xanebavifamopez/clerk_of_works_and_site_inspector_handbook.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
- http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.htmlIn PDF document text
- http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`stream_005_off00007cca.bin`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x7CCA	6768 bytes
SHA-256: `866a7006bd905007371fc27d64282f5eaf906b689c0568cb61449195022ad185`
`font_00_sfnt_off000069b8.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x69B8	5576 bytes
SHA-256: `60fd72116068d90f8568da3cac158acf21e45797f268799dd5efbe6e716e42a6`
`font_02_sfnt_off00008ef1.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8EF1	10308 bytes
SHA-256: `ea9f96581e32eed150eb4895a9bf847c021560f0373ea50911e15d3823a3bb5b`

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