Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2664cf7345195f61…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.3 KB Created: 2021-07-18 18:54:49 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-13
MD5: 1a44d871bb114ffde7e7dbbc8b64784b SHA-1: d3f6552a43b26073df596e1e9e12cb049012f9ef SHA-256: 2664cf7345195f615aa152dc44b6cb1873a6abba46af838c24c4a875a11a6c14
276 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. It employs social engineering tactics, impersonating Microsoft to lure users into clicking a link or executing commands. The heuristics indicate the document instructs users to copy/paste content into a terminal, consistent with ClickFix attacks designed to bypass macro restrictions and likely download a second-stage payload. The embedded URLs point to compromised WordPress sites and link farms, suggesting a phishing or credential harvesting campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9951

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+know+the+wifi+password+in+windows+10.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.sunarozlem.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/09smge1o48bdla9bos0kde4021/13390503691.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://europacreativaeuskadi.eu/files/galeria/files/rojufevaje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://victory-agency.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a3ccf70621b---10183529475.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hmjrgoldhockey.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b3bd0de7e9899fd0c3c2355fff993327/batevikowaluvori.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rrr71.ru/upload_picture/72488009511.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://glass-haus.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/cb6db5693cd2cfa71e56e51f234ee946/fizemopofi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.carlosfunes.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d3a7c567577---xolebirixoxuzutazatabitu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://yourtuscanyguide.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/qg1u4ujs7k3k14ge0v3biskap0/44077861993.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://highendschmiede.de/highendfiles/file/4118190631.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://master.plus/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/34c93a24f2847d33a464ca948fece5a1/84800950388.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.electriclighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b03881ae95185924f020de3a854b1d0f/mimilil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aannemingsbedrijfbarthulsbosch.nl/userfiles/file/26156802104.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://abandassociates.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/38764792959.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stopasbestos.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160aa628d9d995---26348508302.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tehnol.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c0057a4e701---redixa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tecsal.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b4376db363e---42719479473.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.kngroup.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a9c52e686dc---sadijilivodagasigozo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rmissio.pl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160825b2f91a79---80618940278.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pasarantogel.com/contents//files/75012010665.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://storage-in-motion.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16072f32439db8---83013304612.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tocgia247.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/svub77inp2oieb0t19a7qqvrtg/lumake.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hafa-verein.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e12487fdbc14fc31b3ca739d810d37a9/81028509625.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://insidethedigitaltrend.biz/userfiles/file/gizuxebilojinejizexivu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://psfund.org/public/uploads/files/cms_files/niwonisegos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://haumeaonline.com/userfiles/file/17649238856.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+know+the+wifi+password+in+windows+10PDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e815.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE815 17508 bytes
SHA-256: f9da0951caafb12a69abb3c349291324db2a8656c928c39b501ec20aed5be4c7
font_01_sfnt_off0001166e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1166E 10892 bytes
SHA-256: 786c34631e9148bdbd0b4ae0030de8d382198f625edf203d590734ee42c72b0d
font_02_sfnt_off00012fa1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12FA1 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1