Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 26648c38a394bd4a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

18.4 KB Created: 2020-04-04 09:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: e447a62f131e9765469d46a37e27d6bf SHA-1: 126e216321a8fca1da73dc9859caed6adca23a46 SHA-256: 26648c38a394bd4a4b6a7e5b849b2b2f2a21b78794fb2b412fd7f27e53caa97a
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains a VBA macro that is triggered by the AutoOpen event. This macro utilizes the URLDownloadToFile function, indicating an intent to download and execute a second-stage payload from a remote source. While no specific download URL was extracted, the presence of this functionality strongly suggests a downloader or droppper malware.

Heuristics 5

  • URLDownloadToFile in VBA critical OLE_VBA_DOWNLOAD
    URLDownloadToFile in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
13fda20539e13e4b6796ebac2417fa1ee51294008462e8a08fb83d66a9daadd6		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3722 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
vbaProject_00.bin
4a3b549ae1a0778bcd2798a95413a618f763fcc705a9862f0c10be8cc54ed835		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15360 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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