Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 264f0534cab51354…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.78 MB First seen: 2022-12-18
MD5: 189183f0fcb3ddca384604d88a6f15ae SHA-1: 19b710e99726b7d70b3ad407389d1efe0f6841f4 SHA-256: 264f0534cab513547b16dd6089b22b8e87079d403159ba4550dc22c1c5ba4311
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation, specifically related to CVE-2017-11882 through the Equation Editor OLE object. The presence of \objdata and \objupdate directives strongly suggests an attempt to trigger OLE activation and execute embedded malicious content. The decoded object data contains obfuscated JavaScript-like functions, indicating a likely downloader or execution stage.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000011e1.bin
7e6fd214b88542f7a95ff998fb09199198aaf77cd6a27f2e38a82f4e8a0bc358
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1 53934 bytes
objdata_01_off0002fd8f.bin
abd132bf3ab8190dfb030bcb879a36061e9aef78c1060b63bd0588b35c7d316c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2FD8F 454791 bytes