Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 264186d2d052d940…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.6 KB Created: 2021-03-04 05:53:08 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-06-17
MD5: 00d4bb8a670a916ee364200f8b0ba167 SHA-1: 5141d4555316b34967aaebeb0a11b04a3e30ee20 SHA-256: 264186d2d052d94073f56c50e7eea90d16fe3dbcb4e80377499cfa1b3a898ca4
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, with critical heuristics identifying it as a malicious redirector and a link farm on disposable hosting. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness. While no scripts were extracted, the document's structure and embedded links suggest an attempt to redirect users to malicious sites, likely for phishing or malware delivery, aligning with spearphishing attachment tactics.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/wix?keyword=assisted+living+policies+and+procedures+manual In PDF document text
    • http://filuniguwol.22web.org/pozuzajux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4381291/normal_6019a9258399d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://20970907.net/murder_hornet_nest_destroyed_video80je8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/zexetiminav/oTgihe8/shredder_chess_openings_database.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://capridigi.com/smelly_shoes_ni_no_kuni_2rzzbz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4470211/normal_5ff49f909863a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bikuribowe.22web.org/pidera.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4454054/normal_5fd1eae1ce47f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pizanexezorok.22web.org/line_6_spider_ii_150_watt_combo_amp.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://nuzexev.epizy.com/63182793326.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vibupozikijebi.rf.gd/ce_declaration_of_conformity_sample.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lulanojejol.epizy.com/41738838076.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lefivaselefen.rf.gd/veruwetabosogebuxizir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sesoxevanadike.epizy.com/buzasilometebamuxabal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dinixikidimed.epizy.com/xuraj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gelifadewew.rf.gd/jixenamap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wudokuzogikozu.rf.gd/nubevu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kipixuge.epizy.com/73070173602.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d841.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD841 5428 bytes
SHA-256: d751185a61fc96da9858d8d6a3277bde215bb1aeabe47e3b6d9c92f12f7c2d2b
font_01_sfnt_off0000eb02.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEB02 5444 bytes
SHA-256: 739a472b944d3e1d57f0c79dbfc628a1d46b289df462d0234c1a9a2d09a38b33
font_02_sfnt_off0000fd79.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFD79 10240 bytes
SHA-256: c2c8772f9026e249589a4cef9a89d1f30b53be300201e73bcb1d58e399e2e3f5

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