Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 263485c2c9e4da2f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

184.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-01-20
MD5: 11755fd7597fe1225eee8f2a91b02f72 SHA-1: e76614f8b9d2da386f0e45664c769792e6a6101c SHA-256: 263485c2c9e4da2fa483d9bf845262fe0faebaf19ffc2c9b8fe5b3e86bea1c67
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that is known to be exploitable via CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the document is opened. No VBA macros were found to be executable, and the document body is generic spreadsheet data. The primary attack vector is the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBP) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBP)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
d846376e71a16e045e3a34c77573c3c1cb089928f756c706ca1f11d94993c94b
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0295A166/ole10NAtIvE 1250 bytes