Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 262faa304d4c46a7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.8 KB Created: 2020-10-05 18:10:34 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 116d84e9a2c898dda82b3c06906cfd21 SHA-1: efd9bac3c528db98f0cd25433b47fe0e391936d2 SHA-256: 262faa304d4c46a772e1eebac0ea6b3061e6d5713128bf6c56d3a46e6028de73
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to other PDFs hosted on disposable domains, forming a link farm. One of these links redirects to malicious infrastructure, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=coa+test+study+guide In PDF document text
    • https://site-1038779.mozfiles.com/files/1038779/8954147144.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040571.mozfiles.com/files/1040571/44706957060.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036920.mozfiles.com/files/1036920/botegujutakaridunamodi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.andymeyers.info/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814605/wejupuxozo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.gabeoppenheim.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874676/4a1bc739919b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vuwomozu.artculturevs.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379394/debazemololumobug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ruzefap.chagahealthandwellness.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131382274/6261558.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.cyberzone.ca/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606000/nabux-bakogezejamovi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/41f25b0a-c9d8-4acf-b3b5-95bbc865f34d/43991080203.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/15bc6e86-e8b1-4015-8831-cabb414cea37/40121329977.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/bebaa9fc-72b1-4a31-973f-08f80b4cc136/netazefazugananusufon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/77faf744-3cf8-440c-b4ce-4c8ba3a557eb/fivevuwuxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/07e05bf7-bfd3-433a-9b13-137d864ae907/zominepexezewixoga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006615.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6615 4872 bytes
SHA-256: 6125fdcfe8bda4c8978742364976e34c4ffc609cdacb1938e85d07928ff83ee2
font_01_sfnt_off000076c6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x76C6 10568 bytes
SHA-256: 7a178410cb706108095d1f9be4b62a8e9dfa93a9408a958aa2967b00b520684f

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