Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 260e7ead3705dcf8…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

24.3 KB First seen: 2022-11-10
MD5: 91e2e87f4fc5bed4c805ee0eed71fd4b SHA-1: 4fb94c3b4df01c862166ddb25bc205194008f0c2 SHA-256: 260e7ead3705dcf8bc934ce7d70d24854b85ab9bffa1288e1e125d058a0f9ea9
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a specific Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit CVE-2017-11882. The \objupdate directive forces the OLE object to activate, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers. No scripts were extracted, and the specific exploit target is inferred from the heuristics.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000465a.bin
5420193d078e1a3f808b17e76bb6868f2b372c17f56037828fc7b38e4f31694d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x465A 1941 bytes