Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 25fbe263cb05ee29…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

845.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 5e00e4ec0959027cf8980b5e32659fad SHA-1: 297178f7a81fd242dc9e9e9a2bc08a30abe19795 SHA-256: 25fbe263cb05ee2990b5cc9b984643b6bf3f50d0165fde95f9d1ee1c8a324611
108 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE object, which attempts to load a remote resource from the URL http://00000@000030000704376/httpsblog.photobucket.comsecure-photo-sharing-keeping-your-photos-safe-and-secure-workingskill.php. This suggests the file acts as a downloader for a secondary malicious payload. The presence of an embedded PDF with suspicious findings further supports a multi-stage attack. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the OLE object itself is the primary vector.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://www.extensis.com/meta/FontSense/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off000a9200.pdf
7b52a0b411f55c5e9adccae0ffff3250bf60da23b2e2d2bc1e7131dc783a4825		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xA9200 173056 bytes

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