Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 25ddac0d7b120cda…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.6 KB Created: 2021-09-09 11:51:46 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 4ed6a2b9f7350f6676204842280c5283 SHA-1: 77539711a379041fc27b8897c8bdba1483003692 SHA-256: 25ddac0d7b120cdad08e1734340de04baf221ab39f9ff60bee948fe12918f121
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and numerous external URIs, many of which point to compromised WordPress sites hosting further PDF files. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or distributing further malware. The presence of embedded JS suggests an attempt to exploit PDF vulnerabilities or redirect users.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9975

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://wastran.ru/uplcv?utm_term=app+to+transfer+files+from+phone+to+phone PDF link annotation
    • http://intechsol.kz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161324811c8876---19834116642.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://inventory-acepipe.com/images/uploads/files/lawagajomevodonumuvovuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://k85shj16h-561lt.com/contents/files/zumobakupitute.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://investmentskillsgroup.com/images/userfiles/file/99592540367.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://balticstroy.com/uploads/files/jevegewunepiwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sakem.org/userfiles/files/51369830041.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fixafilm.se/userfiles/file/zigorozanagevaluzi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.portofmiamitunnel.com/system/js/back/ckfinder/userfiles/files/3694168924.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://britishcytology.org.uk/ckfinder/userfiles/files/samolibidomuvovavafesi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://antonioruizabogados.es/userfiles/file/zigufirumisefimofu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ratoempat.com/contents/files/nirewamujuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://global-poseg.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16132efdcc49ee---41141965114.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rallyteamwalraven.nl/file/metekipuronogon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.1atlanticfunding.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1612ff6fdf04ba---kewajejefaxako.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rosenstein.lu/userfiles/files/13907551920.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://harmony.im/userfiles/file/89617924912.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://timnhanhonline.net/upload/files/xupetoxovoxufiropowu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://klhl.com/userfiles/file/dasimabenosanuxizaxug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://neo-net.info/giganet/files/file/55479319899.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.fullertherapy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161363fd51607e---vigunujoguxumafetuxijej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://abctranslink.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/tumilupupofopuzo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sourceandsecure.com/uploads/userfiles/file/88514767800.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rayhovietnam.vn/upload/files/77328492886.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pololanna.com/user_img/files/48264876355.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://igruppe.no/ckfinder/userfiles/files/8645207704.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000db6b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDB6B 17384 bytes
SHA-256: 802f3cda6e141e9f41f8c4f00dc1f7ea6ff0303a65a8faf239682fa30c9d06ee
font_01_sfnt_off0001081b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1081B 10604 bytes
SHA-256: 03a4c32be5252a5539998a6ab43a2e803140bda845fe86b69b76870453626542
font_02_sfnt_off00012026.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12026 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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