Malicious Office (OLE) / .PPT — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 25d19d52baeecce6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .PPT

66.5 KB Created: 2021-04-25 20:30:06 Authoring application: Microsoft Office PowerPoint
MD5: 33060d8e82993a5aa31dfa09fd7e5b3e SHA-1: 308172aa859f8f23c8974072c1d0ee19979a5695 SHA-256: 25d19d52baeecce651566f8fa16fa86c8f81e162bc2456d16f13fc4a65306951
240 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1218.005 System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta

The sample is a PowerPoint file containing VBA macros. Critical heuristics indicate the use of Shell() and Auto_Close macros, which are often used to execute arbitrary commands. A high-severity heuristic also flags a reference to mshta.exe, a common LOLBin for executing malicious scripts. The presence of these indicators suggests the macro is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. No specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Reference to mshta.exe high SC_STR_MSHTA
    Reference to mshta.exe
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Visible LOLBin command execution instruction high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Document contains instructions or visible command text involving Windows script/execution tools such as PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, or regsvr32
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.j.mp/hdjkashbdjkabfkagshk
    • http://www.google.com

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
8ae49e0c85b705fa3372196052199237f8bc8131adf0157d4ea96441faee557e
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 954 bytes