Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 25c3f00491c48fb2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

212.1 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: bb73fa597ba386712617f9f2ed18a70e SHA-1: c74000cdd059faf131db55457c37dc5fdcf2a8a5 SHA-256: 25c3f00491c48fb2b5425b663c45559bd573d358acdc2f3ca62ad278a98f21f1
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The OLE document exhibits a significant slack space anomaly and contains an appended executable payload, strongly indicating it's a container for malicious code. While VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of the appended payload suggests the file's primary purpose is to deliver a secondary stage. The SHA256 hash is included as a primary IOC.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 217,156 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 192,591 bytes (89%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.

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