Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 25bf7d4ce0e7ef99…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.12 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-10-05
MD5: 72d6f3545a807e21ecc1787743d0e15c SHA-1: 7f8865ed14d71edf60003d691ad60f8e410a1835 SHA-256: 25bf7d4ce0e7ef9956bdcfe5925ab436ca60f476f500d4692b4e9564410dc20f
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor object that exploits CVE-2017-11882 to deliver a secondary PDF payload. This PDF contains a direct link to an executable payload hosted at https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com. The VBA macros are benign and do not appear to be the primary delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
84b602dd9146d5ca650015e1e6a69ab2a9b653c1286fc607a9eaecea899a17a6		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00037F36/oLE10NaTIVe 1882 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0006d000.pdf
958d148ba4014aa748bfb19370af80725cca2f03184649a5b475f5df68f70735		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6D000 730624 bytes
stream_004_off00005d60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5D60 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
b39f9a00c3e2e1c07e0f112b9c4cbed44c14633944cf3a414c96138728fbc317		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1172480 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
d45a6c91c7431a3a24c053107476fa93581a66c2404d3e0b6ed015d0633ab62d		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1150976 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029600.pdf
a8e2dbefe5977d505da74d6a7c8b4a9d31d05e164dee06a64b0543e67e6c2fd0		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29600 1007616 bytes

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