RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 258b2e208c0249f6

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

375.9 KB

MD5: a8f12e36aff9bde842633fe3dda103b2 SHA-1: 3baac9680e5a06419bb143855fed8dfcb32cd1d4 SHA-256: 258b2e208c0249f6992270ca10dfba9e8f656fb4798b15da8120110463edff03

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with specific heuristics indicating automatic linking and updating, suggesting an attempt to execute embedded code. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic firing confirms the presence of a prompt to enable editing, a common tactic for macro-based malware. No specific IOCs like URLs or hashes were extracted, but the structure strongly suggests a downloader or dropper.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000bac.bin` `f50f56b2def0cca889dd20a0aaace612aeec0e19e7da8e9fa2d368ee09a3c5a6`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xBAC	79788 bytes
`objdata_01_off0000735b.bin` `5c8ce2061eac18e5fd5862d09e5f3aca4af447228b8574ccdae411d9473fa759`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x735B	79761 bytes
`objdata_02_off0002fc0a.bin` `a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2FC0A	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off000311ad.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x311AD	12297 bytes

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