Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 257ede66b4ca9cf0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

33.0 KB
MD5: 64eca8cf6873df70a5f2fc69c7fcbc13 SHA-1: b55bf5a119f3def153785f500d9ca4d371d2ca83 SHA-256: 257ede66b4ca9cf0e410c3a05e1e1d2ab38cc09515713d828a20a044fe7a5a8d
60 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password, a common technique to evade static analysis. Heuristics indicate it's an exploit carrier containing an OLE object, suggesting it's designed to drop or execute a secondary payload. Without further analysis of the OLE object, the exact attack vector and family remain unclear.

Heuristics 2

  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.