Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2578bb0c2e8ce643…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.18 MB
MD5: 4b11464bba150c6cdeff49f766199ee9 SHA-1: 5dd0e7aab51b257947cdf65d7fa2c3f4b5007686 SHA-256: 2578bb0c2e8ce643bd865bb2ded77f84b3ef3f0f87db5159394a976b1a51edc8
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics indicates that the file is designed to exploit this known Microsoft Office vulnerability. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic further suggests that the embedded object is set to activate automatically, leading to arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000011e1.bin
da593452f9a6907b4f26f3452a1d43b6e060bdf7df788f49d41f26ef303dc645		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1 43173 bytes
objdata_01_off0002616b.bin
1dff60c32303d58fd426d1215689e547377c88210d425e277a4a202bc2e03050		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2616B 543771 bytes

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