Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 254fa2af0e65393a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

238.6 KB
MD5: 06a4e4568ad4d8c3e304a24a6e46e2d8 SHA-1: b9bb74461815c315d078eeda0f2f0d787200df04 SHA-256: 254fa2af0e65393af24f5f95b44948e901175c4cfc3a1d40385ed517f6d4986f
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to execute arbitrary code upon opening the document, often delivered via spearphishing attachments. No specific family could be identified from the available evidence.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000008c.bin
9058cf97610addec76b40ba2280f17e42c36407c4c94dbf64923d742aac89cc6		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8C 73255 bytes

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