Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 252d74b292598d80…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

27.5 KB First seen: 2022-10-24
MD5: 828ef2dee58349ca895b8deaa3d4b2bb SHA-1: 7739939e78b4b5715c77306b4d2eb297084bdabb SHA-256: 252d74b292598d80aabb48bf68a6ce91d2b42479f8c2c7f5329db3deade6a96e
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is a password-encrypted OOXML document identified as an exploit carrier for CVE-2017-0199. It contains an embedded URL that likely serves as a remote loader for a second-stage malicious document. The document body was not extractable due to encryption, but the exploit carrier heuristic strongly indicates a malicious intent to download and execute further payloads.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://zswqaaawweasdadfdgdfgzaqswwwwqaazzasj@172.245.142.35/zziioooooeroiooisodfo___---------_---sdfjhjjhjhjhhj/zziiuf_zzswessd.doc