RTF malware analysis — malicious · 251ac48a2ac06df0

MALICIOUS

RTF

49.6 KB First seen: 2024-07-17

MD5: 4b6fd22b58ccca2615916ce83f33a640 SHA-1: 0aa84bf29878ce6a516a922faf89585324b5a318 SHA-256: 251ac48a2ac06df086b12a1f0d754337c34d6531885c41792b1dc3467aeca784

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded object is automatically activated upon opening, likely to execute a secondary payload. The specific exploit used is identified as a vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000141e.bin` `1c9b5f473fdcc8cc41a618f9ac2b1bf34eeab0729b5ffccf7520591bf7dcb08e`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x141E	951 bytes

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