Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 24f158730e88691b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

260.0 KB
MD5: d0ff7a90f0904098a523dcba0d049ca5 SHA-1: 1342236a00ebd5b9e67361de8d91db9e6551fe76 SHA-256: 24f158730e88691b100c8412e68b0360550bb31942a53c3dd30863326d154873
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious Attachment T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is an encrypted Excel file that contains an Equation Editor OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is anomalous and likely carries a payload, specifically targeting CVE-2018-0798. The encrypted nature and the use of the Equation Editor suggest a delivery mechanism for a second-stage exploit or malware. No document body text was extractable due to encryption.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML contains embedded Equation Editor data with anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Equation Editor object carries payload-like Ole10Native stream high OLE_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE_PAYLOAD_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object declares the Equation Editor CLSID but stores a large high-entropy Ole10Native stream with malformed package sizing. This is exploit-shaped Equation/OLE payload evidence.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.

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