Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 24ce033f0ac93092…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.37 MB
MD5: 6d75da825a857518ac032cda4b1687fe SHA-1: 01c7c9388cb702da778fe9daf24269195081f27a SHA-256: 24ce033f0ac930923a7dce27a518e8f7270fde1854d63965c2e6d4f88bf9eef7
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is an OOXML file that is encrypted with a default password and contains embedded OLE objects, specifically identified as Equation Editor objects. High-severity heuristics indicate that these Equation Editor objects are acting as exploit carriers, likely leveraging a known vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to execute a payload. No document body or scripts were extracted, but the presence of the Equation Editor exploit carrier strongly suggests a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Equation Editor object carries payload-like Ole10Native stream high OLE_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE_PAYLOAD_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object declares the Equation Editor CLSID but stores a large high-entropy Ole10Native stream with malformed package sizing. This is exploit-shaped Equation/OLE payload evidence.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.