Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 24b15d31f3b0cd67…

MALICIOUS

PDF

743.9 KB Created: 2012-06-28 08:58:17 -04:00 Authoring application: Adobe InDesign CS4 (6.0.6) (via Adobe PDF Library 9.0)
MD5: f21b377e6bb4fb820a056a2716218090 SHA-1: c6ec4b0b8801f59246a58bf91230c0b8e5206673 SHA-256: 24b15d31f3b0cd67da9d9ac4851cf9f0c665852bd893a1716e8d05f936a3510a
466 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF leverages a known vulnerability (CVE-2010-1240) to execute cmd.exe. The command line indicates it will attempt to execute a dropped payload named 'example.pdf', which is actually a Windows executable. The PDF also contains JavaScript that facilitates the dropping of this executable. The presence of embedded URLs suggests a potential download or command-and-control channel.

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\example.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://eproof.dartmouthjournals.com/pdfproofing/forms/determine_reader_version.pdf
    • http://eproof.dartmouthjournals.com/pdfproofing/forms/annotate_readerX.pdf
    • http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep2.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ManifestItem#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xmp/InDesign/private
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
example.pdf
2a193898ffb5a819708544b0f50dcc8258e9e80d12015239f75b537b2e797483		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 422 at offset 0xAEC18 73802 bytes
javascript_obj0423_000.js
3775fd32e640dc085c8d538972d22471cdbe3d774964b050eab65eddc41bea8a		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 423 at offset 0xB9857 56 bytes
stream_014_off00002ef2.bin
113214c0bbfe5c9470278c71ce03c32697a6fda99c977966655f2bbfae1025bb		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x2EF2 50254 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000a1e9.bin
726f684c9b92e49bc05494f9fa108fd1fa24cc3614ab45e32df19732901cf6fb		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA1E9 39408 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fb3c.bin
811fe3248962b7cd45b130bdcb7aabc896e7b210c77ca630de25a3e32a894639		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFB3C 25577 bytes

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