Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 24abe021a80f26a6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

227.9 KB Created: 2022-07-29 08:45:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-01
MD5: 7b336340968182016a14a9124d853741 SHA-1: f80c302219470f678d6d857df98a3404a86da128 SHA-256: 24abe021a80f26a695e141437e1aa2d7d6bc41ed95ede191902d69a091ff6298
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is a Microsoft Office document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE object is a package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a JAR file. The embedded OLE object is the primary indicator of malicious activity.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
218681dcc699fd2c9a414d7d79b5cf672d2d7163222f66cfd53881929e3c9008		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 158720 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.96, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
3840afb10496516380bb2f7e00dbe466e8ab6299c6161324b5d4f45d6e3083bb		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 154483 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
7b72f30b959216caa6a9d524a94ab933bc53497920108fe82482ac2f2c1a7ec3		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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