Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 248ead9ef9a2304a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.4 KB Created: 2021-06-17 11:45:33 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-01
MD5: 791682cbd863d34a1f44f3d992d91973 SHA-1: f477cd1083755387a31d17dda6d5b48ba94d7d81 SHA-256: 248ead9ef9a2304a98d82e89ab89a3debe1b2481d789cc019d9b89102e1d2a53
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains an embedded script that likely attempts to redirect the user to a compromised website. The script's content, while mostly metadata, includes phrases like 'Powershell create mail enabled security group' which is often used as a lure in phishing attempts. The numerous external URIs pointing to compromised CMS uploads and link farms further indicate a malicious intent to host or redirect to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://oniceh.ru/uplcv?utm_term=powershell+create+mail+enabled+security+group PDF link annotation
    • http://naturallabs.de/userfiles/file/32199063771.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.kissdocs.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084b86705e4f---towizudir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alacarte-design.de/userfiles/file/48798683337.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.goldenplanet.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16073d677b985a---5261592269.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a22595567e1---14899458480.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.growxponential.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dpe5ajid2vfo9sg5ieitvsrp8g/sepubajagikefovarozola.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sun-green.nl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/89846223511.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rhagro.com.mx/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a1ea0757dcff232faa578e150a1919c2/74285149294.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.advids.co/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16071236db5407---53742728508.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wypelnienia.kratex.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5dec73926071135e2116c27109ad8458/dikiputebipopevukofiku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.bouwenaaneensterkwerkgeversmerk.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bfb810bdf7f---39631833937.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.auditek.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a1178e2cd1a---23745970251.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ecobox.eng.br/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/n3qv2d6vb36b0e8hod2l9opsdg/mazalesut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ampletrekking.com/userfiles/file/14133853442.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hausbootgeiseltalsee.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b515sroerfkpl84tf37dpav7e3/66294668735.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sanders-scottfamily.com/clients/26926/File/59598118211.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0001202e.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x1202E 1646 bytes
SHA-256: 4f9c4340663170a59a527b47a890d9dd17aaff1dbd357ea82ef6a0672037994f
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Serif PagePlus'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Futigu Jicado</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell create mail enabled security group.     Posted by James F. Prudente on September 7, 2018    Office 365 certainly has its plusses and min</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Powershell create mail enabled security group.     Posted by James F. Prudente on September 7, 2018    Office 365 certainly has its plusses and min</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell create mail enabled security group</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Serif PagePlus'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-01-05T03:58:28'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Serif PagePlus'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='e52f4c92-7f3e-40d0-8373-46901e685170'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='750710db-a3e2-4507-a1f0-3845ceb72c3f'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000dcf5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDCF5 5820 bytes
SHA-256: 920588f12d00d48a05626514295f003135785242c8e22cc886d7e97828573cef
font_01_sfnt_off0000f0ae.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF0AE 11648 bytes
SHA-256: d87971226dedc38b2b9969ac98347d7518e2bc636fde3f2392830a9500e74729

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