Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2482dee06d8c7832…

MALICIOUS

PDF

96.2 KB Created: 2021-06-27 06:06:34 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 746f376ca1053d7129b6128f6dc1acc2 SHA-1: c33fc571e655a3524f771bbe8bdcb0d2d19354a1 SHA-256: 2482dee06d8c783271508122438f6601160768b5be98f2efe744bd337dd1fc73
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF document contains multiple heuristics indicating malicious intent, including links to algorithmically generated URLs and compromised CMS upload storage. The presence of a 'download button' lure further supports a phishing or malware distribution attempt. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and linked URLs suggest it is designed to trick users into downloading a secondary payload, likely a trojan as indicated by ClamAV.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9956

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.denisonlandscaping.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16092deca5d0a3---94326911595.pdf
    • https://etonbio.com/newsLetters/images/file/walajulakag.pdf
    • https://www.sussexweddingservices.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b05d84a1a4a---musolumisuzol.pdf
    • https://ahi.com.ua/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0b5cb855dd7d894278182d5a4fd61716/61294515581.pdf
    • http://artistalexanderkanevskyroyalshakespeareglobetheatrelondon.com/clientMedia/file/wegoxuranarivuzad.pdf
    • http://totalfinance.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16073c5cb1187d---28709755413.pdf
    • https://xn-----6kcabagcgfjsxjciriy6alkh6a7aqk.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a039880db57b7e80d3e2a94310db8395/34546939137.pdf
    • https://spencershaulageltd.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c52afaf077348ccf69330fbb4c07e8cd/gasepinalowovasu.pdf
    • http://curry-box-deluxe.de/userfiles/file/92648191550.pdf
    • https://gruntbudowa.pl/files/file/robizanil.pdf
    • https://g3az.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a97ef43051e---zovuxazigirovomit.pdf
    • https://gpuhub.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ltuqqqp3h17um1mgrah9j8f6rt/28914356136.pdf
    • https://sckprime.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c911719ea0a41aa4420c3dd317c93875/68459628366.pdf
    • http://webinside.pl/userfiles/file/67578659527.pdf
    • http://atlantichomeportugal.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16094d5922838a---64863200626.pdf
    • https://alenakovalchuk.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/cced79d695510f6ae3253e0d5367517c/46870764659.pdf
    • https://laser-arena.ch/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16083f7e804b3b---66328342409.pdf
    • https://kicksomeglass.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8e7d1e8cd393e4e48717167e126c9f08/53663149593.pdf
    • https://www.waterlooarmsnewforest.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e51e63657bf6b4a9146e555aef847666/19051925001.pdf
    • https://stratasphere.online/userfiles/file/22831277958.pdf
    • http://tai-group.com/upload/files/22901766206.pdf
    • https://lynnesnaturaltreats.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c66b40cd636659b2edbcb7f9c94a13e3/27815924248.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/ngfLrbzwjls/uplcv?utm_term=answer+tell+us+about+yourself
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000113aa.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x113AA 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00012bbc.bin
de7d77aa8631531e0a19d83a3ac0c951a3e55f544e04744888bf95570ce7dd00
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12BBC 18044 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000159f8.bin
f9b194a93f49985ed10476914498df8104ef2b2f54a84826b3c2068cee8d8007
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x159F8 10536 bytes