Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 248296cf75065c7d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

791.5 KB Created: 2021-09-15 09:19:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-06-01
MD5: 000c10fef5a643bd96da7cf3155e6a38 SHA-1: 9253df019b02e409ac86f9241781b4d1890d3489 SHA-256: 248296cf75065c7db51a793816d388ad589127c40fddef276e622a160727ca29
182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a malicious OOXML document that leverages the CVE-2022-30190 vulnerability. It contains an external OLE object pointing to 'http://212.138.130.8/analysis.html', which is indicative of a Follina exploit stage-1. This exploit likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection further confirms the malicious nature of the file.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2022-30190 — Follina stage-1 external HTML oleObject critical CVE likely CVE_2022_30190
    External OLEObject relationship targets a remote .html with the Follina delivery shape (oleObject -> HTTP(S) HTML with trailing Moniker '!'). In live Follina samples the ms-msdt: trigger is served by the remote HTML, not the document itself.
  • ClamAV: Win.Exploit.CVE_2022_30190-9951234-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Exploit.CVE_2022_30190-9951234-1
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://212.138.130.8/analysis.html
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
5cced16ba73e89550537abba5ad88f6584a2702029705ea65eec75aa5d9922e5
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 3584 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
7f5bfb5bf740f64904a20ae47f1e959e0d7c967fb34d7fa039f82fe01f54746a
ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 484 bytes
emf_00.emf
95faa0e5245b4cd17b283431e832f5e5e77c3f5b9fc0f8f5f257a3155ce528f6
ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 250588 bytes