Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2466df98c4b5602d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.0 KB Created: 2020-10-29 11:52:14 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-03-01
MD5: d33ca9ed96b87891d1483d4aa24243d5 SHA-1: c2d3402b61cbe4ea916cf3537fecd8b912bba863 SHA-256: 2466df98c4b5602dfa40ba36250898dd7866e49e95cd5645ea9d3a11011a52ce
234 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/123?keyword=chromebook+boot+from+usb+linux In PDF document text
    • https://vekejuritikoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857631/9293837.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pibazafefudo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776509/zuxevukemin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jikeberu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857846/zofimamolokene-supokumulal-pebexig-wezowowegese.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dosaremuxabibi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739916/vivokevuvekine.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nogafuku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815296/5987814.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://podesasi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437149/2774461.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dofuliral.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134346813/selut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://senobatupubem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437889/larodajojurufup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kuromazu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695519/ladut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sabidodavo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408103/2310212.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bizumoku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681494/b8fcf0a0b363836.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gozekukapitob.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134443516/pefaratu_disizobifopew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0497/2845/4842/files/scanner_manuale_in_inglese.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/leteraxewe/87687183363.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0496/2700/5094/files/sefodivipogazune.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sivanira/blockchain_pour_les_nuls.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bakoloj/60663471126.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/2210/4222/files/capital_market_analysis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pazifetanegapu/xitimaro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pizexopenaxu/pdf_to_kindle_mobi_format.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/henghuili-files/aparato_reproductor_femenino_funciones.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/robumuduluwise/80155473047.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007508.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7508 4976 bytes
SHA-256: 494b450b6747ec1194e3f200b7e5fdb57ea65602cb0547af0add024074efc751
font_01_sfnt_off000085cc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x85CC 10716 bytes
SHA-256: 68dd658a599f160dff6393a4e6c2ed7021e6147c291b6236ae1d581bd8c2d7c1