Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2450e082147d46b6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

27.7 KB First seen: 2022-12-06
MD5: 7491a7d24a91632ccbb5b427813b3af4 SHA-1: 9372c849f9612e83e82d605e9c342fa9148e5367 SHA-256: 2450e082147d46b692e3ff2cfc70c64b9e3e1e5dcab9afed208b28dc0557b4ee
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_OBJUPDATE` and `SE_ENABLE_LURE` heuristics indicates the document is designed to trick the user into enabling content, which would then trigger the OLE object activation. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploits.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004a7f.bin
a013de0a8d93f4a3766b567bdf44b2cf039502887e4b193ae372d7fd9d7d47ef
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4A7F 1697 bytes